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Weak parapets: Protecting the travelling public 
 
Eleanor J Russell  
Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
The author considers the recent decision in Bowes v The Highland Council [2017] 
CSOH 53 which provides a cautionary tale for any roads authority which might be 
tempted to disregard safety advice given by technical experts. 
Introduction 
While it is well known that roads authorities have competing demands on their limited 
budgets, failure to address known hazards may have devastating consequences for 
members of the travelling public and may result in the imposition of liability. The 
recent case of Bowes v The Highland Council is one such example. The opinion of 
Lord Mulholland provides a welcome overview of case law in this area and clarifies 
what is required for a successful claim in Scotland.  
 
Background to the case 
The circumstances of the case are tragic. On a February morning in 2010, 
David Bowes was driving his pickup truck across the Kyle of Tongue bridge. He was 
alone in the vehicle. The weather was poor with squalls of snow showers and the 
road was covered with snow and slush. Mr Bowes’ vehicle crossed from the 
westbound to the eastbound lane, mounted the kerb on the north side of the bridge, 
collided with the parapet and fell into the water. Sadly, Mr Bowes was unable to 
escape from the vehicle and drowned. The bridge was owned by the Highland 
Council which had responsibility for managing and maintaining the bridge and its 
parapets. Several members of the deceased’s family sought damages from the 
council on the basis that the accident was caused by its failure at common law to 
take reasonable care for the safety of Mr Bowes whilst crossing the bridge. 
Proof on liability 
The case came before Lord Mulholland for proof on liability. At the proof, the 
pursuers led evidence from several witnesses, including Les Christie, the defender’s 
engineer who had produced a report on the bridge in 2005, John Webb, a civil 
engineer who co-authored a report on the bridge in 2008, Dr John Searle, a 
chartered engineer who produced an expert report and Ian Hunt, a bridge engineer 
who also produced an expert report. The defender led evidence from Ian Moncrieff, 
David MacKenzie, and Donald Louttit, all engineers with Highland Council, 
Mark Littler, a Forensic Collision Investigator and William Day, a Chartered 
Civil Engineer. 
The single lane carriageways of the Kyle of Tongue bridge are relatively narrow and 
the road, which is straight, is bordered by a raised footway on both sides. Although 
the bridge is not heavily trafficked, it is an essential link for the local community. It is 
used by school and tourist buses, delivery lorries, a summer bus service between 
Inverness and Durness and emergency service vehicles. If the bridge was closed, 
depending on the size of the vehicle, a detour of around one hundred miles would be 
required.   
There were no witnesses to Mr Bowes’ accident and what happened had to be 
pieced together inferentially from the available evidence. The deceased’s vehicle 
collided with the parapet between stanchions 8 and 9 on the left hand side. It 
appeared that the parapet had not behaved as it should have done, namely to act as 
an elastic band and redirect Mr Bowes’ errant vehicle back into the carriageway. 
Instead, the 12 west most stanchions and railings on the north side of the parapet 
broke off at the welds over a distance of about 38 metres and swung out from the 
bridge. Stanchions 13 and 14 fractured but remained attached. Dr Searle described 
this phenomenon as an “unzipping” of this section of the parapet. The aluminium 
parapet had failed due to cracked post based castings and post/base casting welds. 
The vehicle’s airbags (which were working) had not been activated and the evidence 
indicated that they would have been expected to deploy if the parapet had been 
operating properly.  
There was no evidence that the deceased’s loss of control was caused by 
mechanical failure or by any medical condition nor was there any evidence that the 
carriageway surface was responsible. Witnesses who were quickly at the locus 
spoke to seeing tyre tracks in the slush which ended where the deceased’s vehicle 
collided with the parapet. Assembling all the evidence, Lord Mulholland held that the 
deceased lost control of his vehicle and it gradually, at a shallow angle, veered 
across the carriageway without any discernible attempts to correct the loss of 
control, mounted the pavement and collided with the parapet. This occurred on a 
long straight stretch of road. As there was no non-negligent explanation for the loss 
of control, the Lord Ordinary held that it resulted from the fault of the deceased and 
not from any failure of the defender. There was some evidential base however to 
hold that the deceased would not have been exceeding the speed limit. The 
habitually cautious nature of his driving was spoken to by his partner and employees. 
His speed would have been significantly lower than the 60mph speed limit given the 
weather conditions, the fact that the airbags were not activated, and the limited 
impact damage to the parapet railings. The Lord Ordinary accepted a speed range of 
between 20 – 40 mph. Given the narrowness of the road, the weather conditions and 
the shallow angled tyre tracks, the angle of impact would have been 15 degrees or 
less.  
The parapet was erected on both sides of the Kyle of Tongue bridge when it was 
built in 1971. The parapet consisted of aluminium posts (or stanchions) welded to 
aluminium base plates. The base plates were anchored to the bridge by four bolts 
and three horizontal aluminium rails were bolted to the posts. The parapet was 
designed to contain vehicles weighing up to 1.5 tonnes, travelling at 50 mph and 
hitting the parapet at an angle of 20 degrees. On the day of the accident the weight, 
speed and angle of impact of Mr Bowes’ vehicle were well within the design capacity 
of the parapet. Lord Mulholland therefore concluded that, had the parapet been 
acting to its design capacity, the deceased’s vehicle would have been contained by 
the parapet and would not have left the bridge. Accordingly, the deceased would not 
have drowned. At worst, given the absence of any other traffic at the relevant time, 
Mr Bowes would have sustained only minor injury.  
As far as inspection of the bridge (and its parapets) was concerned, the defender’s 
system involved a general inspection every three years and a principal inspection 
every nine years. The general inspections were visual in nature whereas the 
principal inspections utilised specialist access (including divers). In July 2005, a 
principal inspection was carried out by Les Christie. He was the engineer who had 
responsibility for the bridge at that time. He prepared a report which highlighted 
certain defects on the bridge. Major structural elements were continuing to 
deteriorate. With regard to the parapets, a numbering system for the 58 posts on 
either side was used. On the left-hand side (from which the deceased fell) defects 
were found on post to base welds numbers 14, 43, 53, and 56. A cracked base 
casting was detected at 13 and there was a deflection in the rail between posts 24 - 
36. Further defects were found on the right-hand side. In his report, Mr Christie, who 
was aware of the constraints on the defender’s budget, recommended that major 
repairs to the structure should be carried out without delay and in respect of the 
parapet within the next financial year.  While the defects to the bridge itself were 
categorised as minor or unacceptable, the defects to the parapet were categorised 
as “severe.” Mr Christie gave this rating as he was concerned about safety. 
Mr Christie recommended in his report that: (1) the design and implementation of 
repair works should proceed in the next financial year (2) general inspections should 
monitor the structure condition if repairs were delayed (3) the bridge parapet 
condition should be checked twice yearly to monitor deterioration, until parapet 
replacement was carried out, and (4) a special inspection of the steel work piling 
protective system should be carried out. The overall cost of the work was estimated 
at £1,544,000. That figure included the work to replace the parapets, which was 
estimated at £150,000.  
In evidence, Mr Christie expressed his concern that if one or two posts failed, the 
papapet might not act as it should in the event of being struck by a vehicle. He was 
not confident that the parapet had the capacity to restrain vehicles within its own 
design capacity. He recommended repairs should be carried out as a matter of 
urgency, both in relation to safety and costs, which were going to accelerate. 
Although no proposal for interim measures was contained within his written report, 
Mr Christie verbally recommended to his boss, Mr Louttit, in August 2005, that 
interim measures be put in place pending replacement of the parapet. The interim 
measures proposed were a temporary barrier, the introduction of traffic lights, 
reduction to single lane passage, and a reduction in the speed limit to 30 mph. 
Mr Louttit rejected these proposals. He took the view that a reduced speed limit was 
pointless as it would not be observed. He did not consider temporary measures to be 
necessary or appropriate due to the light traffic on the bridge, good visibility, straight 
road, the absence of an accident history, and the fact that the bridge structure would 
not be compromised by a collision with a parapet. Mr Loutitt did however agree with 
Mr Christie’s recommendation (stated in his report) of twice yearly monitoring of the 
bridge and parapets. Such monitoring was duly introduced.  
Further inspections were carried out in February, June and December 2006, 
September 2007 and January 2008. Although no defects were detected in the 
section of parapet which failed, new defects were detected in other sections on all 
but one inspection. The defects detected (cracks and corrosion) were sufficiently 
serious to affect adversely the containment strength of the parapet. The inspections 
only picked up defects which could be detected visually. Defective welds would be 
unlikely to be detected on a visual examination and if the welds of the box section to 
the base plate were not continuous, water ingress and corrosion could occur.  A 
Metals Consultant conducted a metallurgical examination of three posts (numbers 9, 
10 and 11) and base plates after the accident. Although those three posts had not 
featured as defects in the inspection reports, the consultant’s report stated that the 
weld profiles were irregular and evidence of lack of root penetration and fusion was 
noted in the welds at the front. Porosity was also noted in areas in the welds and 
corrosion was observed in the base plates. He considered that the general quality of 
welding was poor and would not meet approval to the relevant standards of welding. 
After the January 2008 inspection, the defenders ceased monitoring the parapet. 
This decision was taken by Ian Moncrieff, who was principal Engineer responsible for 
bridges in the Caithness area in 2008. He had taken over responsibility for the bridge 
from Les Christie. Mr Moncrieff’s explanation for discontinuing the biannual 
inspections was that the number of new defects had dropped to zero in percentage 
terms, the prospectus for repair was due to be issued and at some point in the 
future, possibly one or more years, major works would be carried out to the bridge. 
Donald Louttit, Principal Engineer for structures at Highland Council was unaware of 
the decision to discontinue the inspections and was surprised when he learned of it. 
He would have continued the monitoring. As was made clear in the Highland Council 
Bridge Maintenance programme Sutherland for 2005 – 2015 dated 3 October 2005, 
the bridge parapet was failing and should be replaced on public safety grounds as 
soon as possible. This was not done prior to the accident and biannual monitoring 
was instituted instead (but, as noted above, was subsequently discontinued). In 2008 
the defender had commissioned a report on the bridge and parapet from 
Faber Maunsell, Consultant Engineers. The report noted that the parapet did not 
comply with current standards for restraint and was classified as low containment 
against current standards. The report noted that the containment level was 
unclear. In evidence, Mr Moncrieff had a limited recollection of the Christie report 
and could not remember looking at the Faber Maunsell report when the decision was 
taken to discontinue the biannual inspections. 
Having described the decision to discontinue monitoring as “inexplicable” (at 
para.20), Lord Mulholland stated (at para.22): 
“In my opinion the decision to discontinue monitoring was wrong, did not make 
sense, was against previous advice and, in relation to a matter clearly related to 
safety, meant that the defender had no idea of the containment strength of the 
parapet, if any, whether it was continuing to deteriorate, to what extent and rate it 
was deteriorating, and what measures, if any, should be taken to deal with the 
problem. The decision was taken in the face of the warnings given by Les Christie, 
the engineer in charge of the bridge who carried out the Principal Inspection in 2005. 
The effect of the decision was that the defender was blind to the state and 
containment capacity of the parapet from 2008 and was not in an informed position 
to consider what safety and interim measures should be taken in relation to the 
parapet. It was essential that the decisions on the parapet should be kept under 
review and revisited in light of the state of the parapet going forward.”   
Moreover, given that the consequences of a defective parapet with little or no 
restraint capacity could lead to the death of a member of the public, Lord Mulholland 
found it “surprising and alarming” (at para.23) that no risk assessment had been 
carried out in relation to the parapet prior to the accident. Although a post accident 
risk assessment produced a figure which did not justify upgrading the parapet, Lord 
Mulholland was highly critical of its methodology and declined to place any weight 
upon it.    
His Lordship went on to observe (at para.23): 
“The bridge is essential for remote communities over which school buses and 
emergency services travel. The safety of these communities is as important as the 
safety of communities in the busy conurbations of the central belt and, as the 
defender recognised after the accident, engineering judgment required there to be a 
functioning parapet. It is therefore clear to me on the evidence that the pursuers 
have established that immediately prior to the accident the defender knew that (1) 
the parapet was not compliant with current standards, (2) it was defective, (3) its 
containment capacity was compromised to an extent which was unknown, (4) it 
would not operate as intended, and as a result a motorist who lost control of a 
vehicle and collided with the parapet could go off the bridge into the water below with 
a risk to life, and (5) had the parapet …been operating as designed it would have 
contained the vehicle on the bridge carriageway and the deceased would not have 
lost his life.”  
 
Legal arguments 
The pursuers did not contend that the defender was obliged to replace the parapet 
prior to the accident but instead contended that interim measures should have been 
introduced or alternatively that the bridge should have been closed. The interim 
measures contended for included a temporary barrier, a reduction in the speed limit 
to 30 mph, temporary traffic lights and consequential single lane carriage and 
warning signs. 
The defender, on the other hand, contended that no duty of care was owed to the 
deceased. Thus, there was no obligation on the defender to provide a parapet of any 
strength, and therefore no requirement to put in place temporary measures pending 
replacement of the defective parapet. Given the low risk of an accident arising out of 
the condition of the parapet, the defender asserted that temporary measures were 
unnecessary given their cost, limited utility and the other risks created by such 
measures. 
Lord Mulholland had little difficulty in rejecting the defender’s argument, doing so 
after a careful analysis of existing case law. First, he examined the relevant statutory 
context. His Lordship noted that in terms of section 1(1) of the Roads (Scotland) Act 
1984, the defender was the roads authority responsible for managing and 
maintaining the road (which included the bridge and its parapets). Section 28 of the 
Act provides that the roads authority may, for the purpose of safeguarding persons 
using a public road, provide and maintain barriers along the sides of bridges, 
embankments or other dangerous parts of the road. It was clear to Lord 
Mulholland from the use of the word “safeguarding” that the legislature considered 
that the provision and maintenance of parapets was for the safety of road users. The 
inclusion of the word “maintain” indicated the importance that Parliament attached to 
a functional parapet. Lord Mulholland observed that sections 1 and 28 did not 
impose a duty on a roads authority in relation to persons using the road but simply 
provided the power to do the things specified therein.    
Lord Mulholland observed that the erection of parapets as an integral part of a bridge 
was consistent with a Ministry of Transport Technical Memorandum from 1967 which 
laid out minimum standards. He continued (at para.25): 
“If a bridge over water, carrying vehicular traffic, was built today without a parapet 
then I would venture to suggest that there would be a public outcry to add to a 
reluctance to use the bridge. A parapet gives comfort to bridge users that there is a 
safety measure which helps prevent vehicles from leaving the bridge...I have no 
doubt that if the majority of drivers knew that the parapets on the Kyle of Tongue 
bridge were defective, to the extent that they may have little or no containment 
capacity at all, steps would be taken to avoid the hazard or moderate their driving 
significantly to take account of the hazard.” 
The issue of whether a parapet could be a hazard was considered in Great North 
Eastern Railway Ltd v Hart and others [2003] EWHC 2450 which arose from the 
Selby Rail disaster. The defendant fell asleep at the wheel of his car which then 
veered off a motorway and landed on a railway line in the path of a high speed train. 
The train was derailed and was then struck by a freight train. Ten people died and 
over seventy were injured. The defendant's insurers sought a contribution from the 
Secretary of State for Transport for negligence in failing to erect a sufficiently long 
safety fence. Mr Justice Moreland stated (at para.44): 
“Hypothetically there could be cases where a vehicle left the highway and 
caused damage without any fault on the part of the driver the effective cause 
being for example a dangerous mal-alignment of the carriageway or 
dangerously insubstantial bridge parapets or approach safety fencing. If such 
dangers were created by the Highway Authority, in such a situation there is no 
reason of policy why the law should not impose a duty of care on the Highway 
Authority not only to users of the highway but also to those who are or whose 
property is on neighbouring land.” 
In Sargent v Secretary of State for Scotland 2000 Rep LR 118, a driver swerved to 
avoid a bus which had crossed in front of his vehicle at a narrow point in a road. His 
vehicle left the road and dropped 20 feet into a loch and the driver was killed. 
Although there was a wall between the road and the loch, it was not designed to 
prevent vehicles leaving the road and there was a gap where the wall had degraded. 
In an action against the Secretary of State, the deceased’s family argued that the 
accident was reasonably foreseeable and that there should have been a sign 
warning of the hazard of buses, a solid barrier, and traffic lights. Lord Clarke held 
that the lack of a restraining structure such as an Armco barrier or properly 
maintained wall at the locus was a serious hazard, meaning that “a vehicle leaving 
the road would inevitably plunge into the loch, with potentially fatal 
consequences.”  (at para.17) 
Lord Mulholland proceeded to examine “a long tract of authority requiring Roads 
Authorities to exercise reasonable care in their management of the roads” (at 
para.26). In Innes v Magistrates of Edinburgh, and the Trustees for rebuilding the 
University of that City (1798) Mor 13189, Lord Eskgrove stated (at p.13190) that 
“[o]ne of their most important duties … is to take care that the streets of the city are 
kept in such a state as to prevent the slightest danger to passengers.” There, a 
member of the public broke his thighbone when he fell into a 15 foot pit in the road. 
In McFee and others v Police Commissioners of Broughty-Ferry (1890) 17 R 764, a 
cab driver was killed when his head struck a low iron bridge. The Lord Justice Clerk 
(Kingsburgh) stated (at p.767) that “[w]e must negative the proposition that the 
Commissioners are entitled to leave a road in a dangerous state, and do nothing for 
the safety of the public using it.”  
In Fraser v Glasgow Corporation 1972 SC 162, an eight year old child dropped a 
lighted paper into the petrol tank of an abandoned car and was injured in the ensuing 
explosion. Lord Milligan stated (at p.174): 
“[A] local authority which has control of a public street may in certain 
circumstances have an obligation to take steps to see that there does not exist 
in a public street something which may cause injury to persons frequenting that 
street … the danger need not necessarily be one arising out of the physical 
condition of the street or pavement…The hazards referred to in most of the 
reported cases were holes in the ground or defects in the pavement, but in my 
opinion an object in the street may equally be a hazard. Should such a hazard 
exist, a local authority, if it is aware of the hazard, is not entitled to do nothing. It 
is bound to take all reasonable steps in its power to have that hazard removed.” 
In McKnight v Clydeside Buses Ltd 1999 SLT 1167 a child who had been seated 
upstairs in a double decker bus was killed when the bus collided with a railway 
bridge. Her parents sought damages from the bus company which in turn sought 
relief from the relevant roads authority. Lady Cosgrove (at p.1172) stated: 
“The duty of a roads authority towards road users is to take reasonable care in 
all the circumstances (Smith v Middleton, per Lord President Emslie at 1971 
SLT (Notes), p 66)… that duty encompasses an obligation on the roads 
authority arising out of their ownership of and responsibility for the road to 
remedy a dangerous situation of the type which the first defenders offer to 
prove was known to exist at the time of the accident…I reject the contention 
…that any duty on the roads authority is restricted to taking care with regard 
only to the actual road surface. In my view, a highways authority is under a 
similar duty of care in respect of road signs placed above the road surface over 
which it has control in terms of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984... What the 
instant case is concerned with are signs which it is averred have given rise to a 
situation of manifest danger to road users. In such a situation I consider that a 
roads authority is under a duty to take steps to remedy the obvious hazard 
which is known to exist: it cannot ignore its duty to act in the interests of public 
safety. Further, it matters not in my view whether the defect arises from the 
original erection of the sign or as a result of it having become faded (as is 
alleged in respect of the chevrons on the bridge). In Laing the Lord Justice 
Clerk (at p 201 (p439) made it clear that the danger which the owner of the 
pavement was bound to have removed included danger arising both from faulty 
construction and by decay from age.” 
Gibson v Orr 1999 SC 420 concerned the liability of Strathclyde Police for failing to 
warn motorists about the collapse of a bridge over which a public road ran. Police 
officers placed cones on the north side of the river but left the scene without erecting 
any barrier or warning on the south side.  A car was driven on to the bridge and fell 
into the river, resulting in the death of all of the car’s occupants except for the 
pursuer. It was held that a duty of care was owed by the police to the pursuer. The 
court drew an analogy with roads authorities. Lord Hamilton stated (at p.435): 
“The functions…of roads authorities in respect of the management and 
maintenance of public roads are laid down, commonly by statute, in similar 
‘public’ terms…it has never, so far as I am aware, been doubted in Scotland 
that as regards operational matters a duty of care is owed by such authorities 
and their servants to road users — a duty not directly under the statute but a 
duty arising out of the relationship between those authorities and road users 
created by the control vested by statute in the former over the public roads in 
their charge” 
Lord Mulholland then turned his attention to the Inner House authority of MacDonald 
v Aberdeenshire Council 2014 SC 114. There, a collision occurred at the crossroads 
of a public road. In subsequent proceedings against the roads authority, it was 
averred that there was no sign giving sufficient advance warning of the presence of 
the junction. The common law case averred that the defenders had created a danger 
to road users and had failed to take reasonable care to devise, institute and maintain 
a reasonable system of installation, inspection and repair of the road markings and 
signage at the junction. Lady Paton in considering whether the roads authority owed 
a duty of care, stated (at para.36): 
“if a section of a country road were to collapse, leaving a large crater or 
sinkhole, and if that hazard was drawn to the attention of the roads authority, 
Scots law would, in my opinion, impose upon the roads authority a common law 
duty of care owed to users of that country road. That consequence would be in 
keeping with Scots common law as it has developed …and would follow from 
the application of tests such as reasonable foreseeability of harm, proximity of 
relationship, and what would be fair, just and reasonable.” 
Lady Paton noted that, in contrast to the English Law of tort, Scots Law draws no 
distinction between acts and omissions. The existence of a duty of care depended 
upon the particular facts of each case. Although the relationship between drivers 
using the crossroads and the authority was sufficiently proximate to give rise to the 
imposition of a duty of care, Lady Paton considered that it was not reasonably 
foreseeable that an accident was likely to occur at the junction. The pleadings 
indicated that the wearing away of the painted lines was a gradual process and there 
were no averments that the roads authority had been placed on notice that the lines 
were fading and constituted a hazard. Lady Paton considered that it would not be 
fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defenders as the situation at 
the crossroads did not (prior to the accident) present as a high priority situation with 
obvious danger demanding prompt attention from the roads authority. Her Ladyship 
stated (at para.43): 
“...in the circumstances of this particular case…the only duty owed by the 
defenders was of a public, general nature, namely to repaint the lines in the 
course of their routine rolling programme of repair and maintenance in the 
exercise of their statutory powers, and on the basis of a timetable fixed by them 
(using their judgment and discretion, the guidance given in local authority 
manuals and codes, and affording certain matters priority over others).” 
However, Lady Paton also considered that as soon as placed on notice, the accident 
having occurred, the defenders’ duties and prioritisation of tasks might change.  
Lord Drummond Young in MacDonald summarised the current state of Scots Law (at 
paras.63-64): 
“A roads authority is liable in negligence at common law for any failure to deal 
with a hazard that exists on the roads under its control. A ‘hazard’ for this 
purpose is something that would present a significant risk of an accident to a 
person proceeding along the road in question with due skill and care...This 
means that, for a roads authority to be liable to a person who suffers injury 
because of the state of a road under their charge, two features must exist. First, 
the injury must be caused by a hazard, the sort of danger that would create a 
significant risk of an accident to a careful road user. Secondly, the authority 
must be at fault in failing to deal with the hazard. This means that the pursuer 
must establish that a roads authority of ordinary competence using reasonable 
care would have identified the hazard and would have taken steps to correct it, 
whether by altering the road, or by placing suitable signs, or in an extreme case 
by closing the road...Those two requirements are in my opinion of great 
importance. The first means that roads authorities are entitled to act on the 
assumption that drivers and others who use the roads proceed with reasonable 
skill and care. That means that it can be assumed that drivers will have regard 
to any obvious dangers on the road and drive accordingly. There is no 
obligation on a roads authority to protect drivers from anything that is obvious. 
Obvious dangers would include bends, blind summits, visible road junctions, 
and the fact that the driver’s view is restricted, whether by buildings, vegetation 
or features of the land and the configuration of the road. In all such cases, a 
careful driver should slow down and look carefully ahead. If he does not do so, 
the accident is his own fault…The second feature means that the hazard must 
be apparent to a competent roads engineer...” 
Having stated the law in those terms, Lord Drummond Young opined that the 
law strikes a fair balance between the interests of drivers and their passengers 
on the one hand and the interests of roads authorities on the other hand. His 
Lordship continued (at para.65): 
 “Roads authorities are under a public law duty to maintain the roads under 
their care, and it seems fair that they should be held to minimum standards not 
just in public law but as a matter of delictual liability in civil law. Eliminating 
hazards, in the sense discussed above, is the minimum that can be expected of 
them. The fundamental fairness of such a duty is supported by consideration of 
the insurance implications of an accident. Third party motor insurance is of 
course compulsory, and if an accident is caused by a driver’s fault those who 
are injured, including his passengers, may expect to obtain recovery from his 
insurer. If the driver is not at fault, however, there can be no recovery, from the 
insurer or the driver. If an accident occurs because of a hazard, in the sense 
discussed above, the critical point is that there is no fault on the part of the 
driver; it is the road that is dangerous rather than the driver. In such a case, 
therefore, passengers will only recover anything if the roads authority is liable… 
Furthermore, for a roads authority that deals conscientiously with its 
responsibilities, the cost of eliminating hazards will be part of its normal running 
expenses. In such a case, therefore, the duty of care imposed by Scots law 
should not add to the costs of the authority. To the extent that claims do occur, 
the cost can obviously be absorbed by insurance by the roads authority. The 
critical point is that the costs of such liability should not impose a serious 
burden on a roads authority, and will be almost non-existent for an authority 
that takes proper steps to eliminate hazards.”  
The respondent in MacDonald had argued that a roads authority should not be under 
any duty of care to road users. It was submitted that the Scottish case law (which 
holds that roads authorities are under such a duty) should not be followed. Instead, it 
was argued that the court should follow English case law which holds that no such 
duty exists at common law and road users should take the highway as found. The 
court in MacDonald rejected that submission. Lord Drummond Young asserted that 
this area of Scots law operates rationally and stated (at para.73): 
“Much of the discussion in the English case law is based on the assumption 
that roads authorities must either be liable in all cases where loss is caused by 
defects in a road or in none of those cases. Scots law, however, takes an 
intermediate position: roads authorities are liable for negligence, but only in 
respect of hazards, in the sense of defects that are unlikely to be noticed by 
road users who exercise reasonable care and skill. This provides redress in 
cases that are not covered by the compulsory system of motor insurance; thus 
there is an economic justification for the Scottish position. Furthermore, the cost 
of eliminating hazards should not be a significant burden for a roads authority 
that takes its responsibilities seriously. Most of the cases where doubts have 
been raised about the stance taken by Scots law have related to snow and ice, 
but these can readily be eliminated by considering the true rule of Scots law, 
which denies a remedy in nearly all such cases. Consequently I can see no 
reason for Scots law to follow English cases in this area. In the English cases, 
however, certain general points are made about the law of negligence, and it is 
appropriate to examine them in order to discover whether Scots law reflects the 
policy considerations that have underlain the English decisions.” 
Lord Drummond Young took the view that the Scottish rule that a roads authority 
might incur liability to road users in negligence was fair and reasonable, applying the 
approach in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. He stated (at 
para.75): 
“The roads authority is responsible in public law for the maintenance of the 
roads in its area, and it does not seem unfair or unreasonable that it should 
take proper steps to eliminate hazards that could not reasonably be foreseen 
by a careful driver, with civil liability if it fails to fulfil such a duty. This should not 
be especially onerous; an authority that takes its public responsibilities 
seriously should deal with such hazards as a matter of course. To the extent 
that a risk of civil liability remains, it can readily be covered by insurance. 
Moreover, in a case where a passenger is injured as a result of such a hazard, 
he or she will be denied redress if there is no liability on the part of the roads 
authority, but may well obtain redress under the existing rules of Scots law.”  
Having reviewed these authorities and returning to Bowes, Lord Mulholland 
observed that the defender’s argument was similar to that which had been rejected 
in MacDonald. The Inner House decision in MacDonald was of course binding upon 
the Lord Ordinary. 
Although the defender in Bowes argued that the defective parapet was not a hazard, 
Lord Mulholland disagreed. In MacDonald a hazard had been described as the sort 
of danger that would create a significant risk of an accident. In the instant case, the 
parapet was defective and its containment capacity was unknown. It posed a danger 
to road users and there was a significant risk of an accident caused by it. 
The defender in Bowes argued that a parapet was not designed for careful road 
users, but for drivers who were at fault. Again, Lord Mulholland disagreed. While a 
parapet may come to the aid of drivers at fault it could also aid drivers who were not 
at fault such as those who have had a heart attack and lost consciousness, or who 
have been shunted from behind into the parapet. Mr Bowes, having lost control of his 
vehicle, was entitled to rely on the parapet to prevent serious injury or loss of 
life.  Had the parapet been functioning as designed, Mr Bowes’ truck would not have 
left the bridge and he would not have drowned.   
Lord Mulholland then alighted upon the issue of whether the authority was at fault in 
failing to deal with the hazard (of which it had knowledge from 2005) prior to the 
accident. In this connection, Lord Mulholland applied the test set out by Lord 
Drummond Young in MacDonald, namely whether a roads authority of ordinary 
competence using reasonable care would have identified the hazard and would have 
taken steps to rectify it. The defender had been placed on notice that the parapet 
was defective to the extent that its containment capacity was unknown as at the date 
of the accident. Mr Christie had categorised the defects as severe and 
recommended that they should be rectified within the next financial year and that 
biannual inspections should be carried out to monitor deterioration, until the parapet 
was replaced. When the accident occurred, the parapet had not been replaced and 
monitoring had been discontinued. 
Lord Mulholland observed (at para.31): 
“The hazard had not been dealt with and the risks that it posed had not been 
mitigated. Had the twice yearly inspections continued then the defender would have 
been in an informed position to consider, going forward, what steps should be taken 
to deal with the hazard. The stopping of the inspections meant that the defective 
parapet and the risk that it posed did not receive the ongoing consideration that it 
deserved. No risk assessment was carried out prior to the accident. The parapet 
would eventually be replaced however long it took. It was replaced in 2011, 6 years 
after Mr Christie had recommended that it should be replaced in the next financial 
year. The defender’s approach was to hope for the best and leave it to chance.” 
His Lordship observed that Mr Christie’s view was that interim measures should be 
put in place but that proposal had been rejected by Mr Louttit, his boss. The 
implementation of interim measures also seemed to be under contemplation by the 
co-author of the Faber Maunsell report although there was no evidence that this had 
been followed up. 
Ian Hunt, a Chartered Civil Engineer, gave evidence that, as far as the defects in the 
parapet were concerned, there would almost certainly be more cracks than were 
visible and he would have expected the defender to be alert to that possibility. He 
regarded roads authorities as having a fundamental duty to protect the public and 
took the view that the travelling public should have been made aware of the weak 
parapet. Having regard to the condition of the bridge parapets in 2005, reiterated in 
2008, he was astonished that nothing had been done to address the position. On 
receipt of the 2005 Principal Inspection report he would have expected the 
responsible bridge management team to have met and considered the implications 
of a “reportedly weak parapet on the safety of the travelling public.”  Following the 
2008 Faber Maunsell report it should have been clear to the roads authority that 
immediate measures were needed to protect the travelling public. Mr Hunt took the 
view that several risk reduction strategies should have been taken. His preferred 
option would have been to impose a 30 mph speed restriction together with signage 
advising of the reason for the speed limit (this could require formal permission). This 
would have cost a few hundred pounds as he would have expected any 
roads authority to have the necessary equipment available in its maintenance yard. 
Temporary barriers in front of the existing parapets should have been erected. The 
defender already had a stock of temporary barriers which could have been utilised or 
the barriers could have been rented or purchased.  Mr Hunt had obtained an 
estimate of £50,000 for 400 metres from a supplier of plastic barriers (which would 
be a capital asset). Mr Day, the defender’s expert, disagreed, as did Mr Mackenzie, 
Mr Louttit and Mr Moncrieff. Their view was that it was reasonable to have taken no 
steps to deal with the defective parapet until it was replaced, having regard to the 
absence of an accident history, the low volume of traffic, the configuration of the 
road, namely long and straight, the non observance of a reduced speed limit, the 
possibility of traffic queues, the risk of overtaking, the ex post facto risk assessment 
which resulted in monitoring only, and the cost of interim measures and replacement 
having regard to the limited budget of the defender. Lord Mulholland was 
unpersuaded by the defender’s argument. In his view (expressed at para.32) “[t]here 
was a pressing need to address this hazard.”  He went on to observe that the council 
took six years to do so from being placed on notice of the problem. 
Although inconvenient for road users, Lord Mulholland observed that a speed 
reduction and single lane carriage were not unduly onerous. Indeed, there were 
many speed restrictions for safety reasons in place in Scotland. It was also 
noteworthy that, when the bridgework was carried out and the parapet replaced, a 
temporary speed limit of 30 mph, a single lane carriageway and temporary barriers 
were in place for approximately 8 months and no evidence was adduced of any 
actual difficulties which resulted. These measures were similar to those which the 
court in Sargent held would have prevented or reduced the possibility of the accident 
there. Lord Mulholland observed that the interim measures were reasonably 
practicable and the cost was modest. The view of Mr Christie, who had proposed 
those measures in 2005, was endorsed by Mr Hunt and supported by the 
Faber Maunsell report in 2008. The reason for not adopting these interim measures 
prior to the accident was undermined by their adoption during the bridge works in 
2011 when the parapet was replaced. They would have warned road users of the 
risk presented by the hazard and would have resulted in them taking care by 
reducing speed and driving to the temporary lights on a single carriageway. The 
temporary barriers and other interim measures would have reduced speeds such 
that Mr Bowes would probably not have left the bridge to his death in February 2010. 
The possibility of this kind of accident was foreseeable. While Lord Mulholland 
accepted that there was no accident history on the bridge, the parapets were erected 
in order to prevent the type of accident which did in fact occur in this case. 
Lord Mulholland concluded (at para.33): 
“The fact that the parapet was erected and then scheduled for replacement when it 
deteriorated is a recognition of a need generated by the foreseeability that an 
accident on this bridge was more than a remote possibility. The fact that it did 
happen is proof indeed that parapets working as intended are required. I therefore 
find it proved that the defender breached its duty to deal with the hazard, namely the 
defective parapets, by implementing interim measures until the parapets were 
replaced. To do so would have prevented the death of the deceased.”  
 
A final point should be made about the defence of contributory negligence upon 
which the defender sought to rely. The defence operates where the pursuer is partly 
to blame for his own loss or injury. The defence is now governed by statute in the 
shape of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. Section 1(1) of the Act 
provides: 
“Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of 
the fault of any other person or persons…the damages recoverable …shall be 
reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the 
claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage.” 
Section 4 of the Act provides that “damage” includes loss of life and personal injury. 
The damage suffered in this case was clearly the loss of Mr Bowes’ life. It will be 
remembered that the Lord Ordinary concluded that the deceased had been at fault in 
losing control of his vehicle. However, had the parapet behaved as it ought to have 
done, Mr Bowes’ life would not have been lost. Indeed, he would only have 
sustained minor injuries or none at all. Accordingly, Lord Mulholland did not regard 
Mr Bowes’ negligent driving as having contributed in any significant way to causing 
the harm complained of. As there was no basis for any finding of contributory 
negligence, Lord Mulholland refused to make any deduction in the award.  
 
Conclusion 
Although injuries sustained on the roads often result from collisions between 
vehicles, some injuries (fatal or otherwise) result from hazards on the roadway itself. 
Bowes is an important decision in that it reaffirms the requirements for the imposition 
of liability in such cases, such requirements having been previously set out in the 
Inner House judgment in MacDonald. First, the injury must be caused by a hazard 
i.e. the sort of danger which would create a significant risk of an accident to a careful 
road user. In addition, the authority must be at fault in failing to deal with the hazard. 
Both of these requirements were met in Bowes: the weakened parapet constituted a 
hazard and by the date of the accident, a reasonable authority would have 
implemented interim measures pending its replacement.  
This case certainly sounds a cautionary note and is one of which all roads authorities 
in Scotland should take heed.   
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